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749 
COMMENTARIES ON THE RECENT 
AMENDMENT OF THE INSURANCE LAW  
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
REGARDING INSURANCE CONTRACTS FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
KUAN-CHUN CHANG  
ABSTRACT 
This Article, which begins with a brief history of the insurance industry 
and insurance law, discusses the recent amendments to the Insurance Law 
of the People’s Republic of China. In particular, this Article focuses on the 
amendments relating to insurable interest, the insured’s duty of disclosure, 
interpretation of contractual clauses, double insurance, and insurance 
fraud. The Article concludes by considering areas with which the 
amendments have not dealt and by suggesting ways in which the 
legislation could improve. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2009, the Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”) was amended, resulting in major changes to both substantive 
insurance contract law and insurance company regulations.
1
 At least 80% 
of the original articles were amended, and the total number of articles 
increased from 159 to 187.
2
 Compared to the last change in insurance law, 
which focused on regulations pertaining to China’s World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) commitments, this amendment placed more 
emphasis on settling insurance contract issues arising prior to the 
amendment and on the prudential regulation of insurance companies. The 
 
 
  Associate Professor, National Chengchi University College of Law, Taiwan. S.J.D., 
Georgetown University Law Center; LL.B., National Chengchi University, Taiwan (1997); M.B.A., 
National Chengchi University, Taiwan (2000); LL.M., University of Pennsylvania (2001); LL.M. in 
Banking and Financial Law, Boston University (2002). Please email kcchang@nccu.edu.tw should 
you have any comments. The author would like to extend gratitude to the Asian Law Institute and the 
National University of Singapore Faculty of Law for all the support in the completion of this Article.  
 1. ZHONG HUA REN MIN GONG HE BAO XIAN FA [Insurance Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 2009) (China) [hereinafter 
Insurance Law of the PRC], available at http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab68/i94860.htm. 
 2.  Id. 
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2009 amendment has improved various aspects of the original insurance 
law by enhancing the protection for consumers under an adhesion contract 
(incontestability clause), clarifying the insurer’s right to rescind the 
contract due to the insured’s misrepresentation, and the addition of a 
requirement specifying the insurer’s duty to explain the contract.3 Despite 
the improvements, issues and unanswered questions associated with this 
amendment still exist. At a minimum, the 2009 amendment fails to address 
the following: (1) the “real” holder of an insurable interest remains 
confusing, (2) the time when an insurable interest must exist, (3) the 
period in which the insured owes the duty of disclosure to the insurer, 
(4) potential obstacles in implementing the incontestability provision, 
(5) possible unfairness associated with the rule regarding the construction 
and governance of contractual terms, and (6) the moral hazard issue 
embedded in rules relating to double insurance. Several perplexities and 
insufficiencies in the old law were not tackled.
4
  
The primary sources of reference for this amendment were American 
and British law.
5
 This research not only examines most of the newly 
enacted articles in light of American and British common law, but also 
provides critiques in accordance with the general principles of both 
insurance theory and law, including principles of indemnity, consideration, 
and utmost good faith. More importantly, due to the civil law nature of the 
Chinese legal system,
6
 this Article examines representative insurance 
legislation recently enacted in the civil law legal systems of Germany
7
 and 
Japan,
8
 which also deeply influence the legal system of another Chinese 
 
 
 3. Hwabo Yang, Woguo Xin Baoxian Fa De Zhuyao Bienhwa [Primary Changes of the New 
Insurance Law] 1 INS. L. REV. 3, 5 (2010). 
 4. For example, the old law and the 2009 Amendment both impose on the insured a duty of 
notification where the double insurance takes place; yet both of which did not provide the consequence 
of violating the duty of notification. Such omission impedes the insured’s incentive to perform such 
duty. For details, see Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 56 (2009). 
 5. For example, the incontestability clause and rules regarding waiver and estoppel have been 
introduced into the 2009 Amendment. See, e.g., Insurance Law of PRC, art. 61 (2009); see also XU 
CHONGMIAO & LI LI, ZUI XIN BAO XIAN FA SHI YONG YU AN LI [NEWLY AMENDED INSURANCE 
LAW—APPLICATION & CASES] 14 (2009). 
 6. A series of statutory laws and regulations constitute the body of law in China. These written 
provisions “include laws (fa), regulatory provisions (tiaoli), rules (guize), detailed rules (xize), 
methods or measures (banfa), resolutions (jueyi), and orders (mingling).”). For details, see JAMES M. 
ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESK BOOK 60 (American Bar Ass’n, 2d ed. 2005). Given that the accepted 
theory of sources of law in the civil law tradition recognizes only statutes, regulations, and customs as 
sources of law, it is more appropriate to categorize the Chinese legal system as a civil law system. 
JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 24 (3d ed. 2006). 
 7. See generally Vertragsversicherungsgesetz [VVG] [Insurance Contract Act], Nov. 23, 2007, 
BANZ at 2631, last amended July 17, 2009, BANZ at 1990, art. 13a (Ger.) [hereinafter VVG], 
available at JURIS.  
 8. See generally HOKENHOU [Insurance Law], Law No. 56 of 2008 (Japan) [hereinafter Japan 
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society, Taiwan, to corroborate some of the viewpoints expressed about 
the 2009 PRC Law. Part II provides a brief history of modern Chinese 
insurance law. Part III examines the sections of the 2009 amendment 
relating to insurable interest, the insured’s duty of disclosure, the 
interpretation of contractual clauses, double insurance, and insurance 
fraud. Part IV explores potential issues and problems not clarified in the 
2009 amendment and proposes suggestions for further amendments. Part 
V will conclude the discussion with a brief remark. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE INSURANCE LEGISLATION 
China’s insurance legislation dates back to 1904 in the Qing Dynasty.9 
The Qing government drafted the Qing Commercial Law, which consisted 
of two chapters concerning loss and life insurance.
10
 The Qing Dynasty, 
however, collapsed before implementation of this law.
11
 The Kuomintang 
[Goumindang] (“KMT”) government drafted the Insurance Law in 1929 
and revised it in 1937. In 1931, KMT also promulgated the Maritime Law, 
which covered marine insurance.
12
 After the foundation of the PRC in 
1949, the State Council promulgated a series of insurance acts and 
regulations consisting of rules, administrative decisions, ordinances, 
methods, and notices.
13
 Most of these acts and regulations focused on 
compulsory insurance, especially for the property of state institutions and 
for the property of ship, train, and airplane passengers.
14
 
China successfully legislated insurance in the Insurance Law of 1995, 
the first national legislation to also provide a framework for understanding 
China’s insurance regulations.15 This legislation consisted of 152 articles 
in eight chapters.
16
 Chapter 1 covers the purpose of the law, definition of 
insurance, scope of the law, and principles of the insurance industry.
17
 
 
 
Insurance Law)]. 
 9. The Legislation on Insurance Law in Mainland China can be traced back to 1904 in “Da 
Qing Shang Lu Caoan” [Draft of the Qing Commerical Rule]. See, e.g., Yu-Xiang Liang et al. Shang 
Xi Fa Jing Lun [Essence of Commercial Law] 524 (2007); QING DAI FALU CAOAN HUIBIAN (II) 
[The Collection of Drafted Laws of the Qing Dynasty (II)] 21–30 (1973). 
 10. GUANGHUA YU & MINKANG GU, LAW AFFECTING BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN THE PRC 
126 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2001).  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Linbo Fan, The Insurance Market System, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE GREAT CHINA 
AREA MAINLAND CHINA, TAIWAN AND HONG KONG 158 (Joseph J. Norton et al. eds., 2000). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. YU & GU, supra note 10, at 126–27. 
 17. Insurance Law of the PRC (1995) (China), available at http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-
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Chapter 2 pertains to insurance contracts and consists of three sections: (1) 
the general rules of the formation, amendment, and performance of the 
insurance contract; (2) property insurance; and, (3) life insurance 
contract.
18
 Chapters 3 through 5 set forth the rules and requirements of 
insurance company administration and supervision, including licensing, 
scope of business, management of premiums, liquidation, and continuous 
supervision.
19
 Chapter 6 provides rules for the oversight of insurance and 
industry-related members, such as insurance agents and brokers.
20
 Finally, 
Chapters 7 and 8 include provisions regarding legal liabilities and 
sanctions.
21
  
As articles pertaining to the supervision and administration of 
insurance companies were still in the early stages of development, the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (“CIRC”) promulgated the 
Regulation Regarding the Administration of Insurance Companies 
(“Regulation”) in 2000 and subsequently amended it in 2005.22 The 
Regulation now has seven chapters with 105 articles, which provide more 
detailed rules for supervising and administering insurance companies.
23
 
China’s insurance industry changed drastically between 1995 and its 
first amendment in 2002. The number of insurance companies reached 
fifty-three by the end of 2002, and the total annual premium income had 
risen from ¥ 460 million RMB in 1995 to ¥ 226.3 billion RMB after the 
first three quarters of 2002.
24
 This growth reflected the increasing number 
of insurance consumers and products, thereby generating demand for 
higher quality service and upgraded regulatory systems. With these 
changed objectives, several parts of the Insurance Law of 1995 ceased to 
be applicable to the market.
25
 Some original provisions even became 
obstacles to reasonable operation in the altered environment.
26
 Soon after 
 
 
centre/laws-and-regulations/insurance/insurance-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-1995.html 
(translating law in unofficial English version). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Regulation Administration of Insurance Companies, China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.circ.gov.cn/ web/site45/tab2746/i21575.htm (translating 
regulation in English).  
 23. Id. 
 24. Statistical Information Regarding the Operation of Insurance Industry, CHINA INSURANCE 
REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab454/ (last visited May 31, 2011). 
 25.  Xu Guojian & Richard L. Mertl, Amending the Insurance Law: Long-Term Policy or 
Expedient Measures?, 16 CHINA L. & PRACTICE, no. 10, Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003, 21, 21–22. 
 26. Id. 
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its establishment, CIRC prioritized amending the Insurance Law of 1995.
27
 
Eventually, the National People’s Congress granted legislative approval to 
CIRC’s amendment on October 28, 2002.28 The 2002 amendment was 
expected to accomplish four objectives: (1) to sustain the reform and 
development of China’s insurance industry, (2) to strengthen supervision 
and regulation of the industry, (3) to standardize the regulation of 
insurance enterprises and business operations, and (4) to fulfill pledges to 
adopt international practices made during the WTO accession 
negotiations.
29
 
To balance the rights and interests of both the insured and the insurer 
as well as facilitate prudential supervision of insurance companies, the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the long-
awaited amendments to the Insurance Law on February 28, 2009 with an 
effective date of October 1, 2009.
30
 The 2009 amendment includes both a 
number of new provisions and extensive changes to existing provisions. 
Compared to the Insurance Law of the PRC in 2002, the newly amended 
version expands the rights of policyholders while imposing heavier duties 
on insurance companies.
31
 
Significant changes resulting from the 2009 Amendment affected 
issues related to the insurance contract, the regulation of insurance 
companies, and the conduct of business. The first category includes 
articles pertaining to the (1) insurable interest, (2) applicants’ duty to 
disclose misrepresentations, (3) interpretation of the policy, (4) timely 
notice of increased risks, (5) insurance fraud, and (6) double insurance.
32
 
In terms of the regulations pertaining to insurance companies, the 2009 
Amendment created additional licensing criteria for the establishment of a 
new insurance company as well as processes concerning the approval, 
fitness, and requirements of directors.
33
 With respect to continuous 
supervision, the 2009 Amendment expands the list of permissible 
investment objects, but it also authorizes the CIRC to take prompt 
corrective action against insurance companies when necessary.
34
 
 
 
 27. Kuan-Chun Chang, Necessary Reform of Insurance Law in China after its WTO Accession, 
31 No. 1 SYRACUSE J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 25, 40 (2004). 
 28. CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 17, 21.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Insurance Law of the PRC (2009); see also XU & LI, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
 31. CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 24. 
 32. Insurance Law of the PRC, arts. 12, 16, 27, 30, 52 (2009). See also BROAD & BLIGHT 
ATTORNEY AT LAW, THE 2ND AMENDMENT TO CHINA’S INSURANCE LAW, available at http://www. 
broadbright.com/nl/(No.11)The%202nd%20Amendment%20to%20China's%20Insurance%20Law.pdf. 
 33. CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 31–33. 
 34. Insurance Law of the PRC, arts. 106, 139–141 (2009). See also YUJING SHU, JOHN M. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
754 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:749 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies 
were deliberated and adopted at CIRC’s executive meeting on September 
18, 2009 to conform with and implement the newly enacted Insurance 
Law.
35
 
III. PRIMARY CHANGES TO INSURANCE CONTRACTS  
IN THE 2009 AMENDMENT 
Although the 2009 Amendment retains the structure and organization 
of the old law in the Insurance Law of 2002 and Insurance Law of 1995, 
the number of articles has increased from 158 to 187 and several chapters 
have been renamed.
36
 The latest legislation retained the eight chapters 
from the old law that Part II discusses.
37
 This Part reviews the law as it 
pertains to insurance contracts. 
A. The Insurable Interest 
1. The Insurable Interest Requirement 
The Insurance Law of 2002 required an applicant to have an insurable 
interest in the insured subject matter as the prerequisite for an effective 
insurance contract.
38
 Under the old law, therefore, if the applicant holds no 
insurable interest in the subject matter, the corresponding insurance 
contract is deemed invalid.
39
 Given that the old law did not distinguish 
insurable interest in property insurance from insurable interest in life 
insurance, Article 12 of the 2009 Amendment specifies that the applicant 
for “personal insurance” shall have an insurable interest in the insured 
person when entering into an insurance contract.
40
 The insured person with 
 
 
SYLVESTER, & IRIS HE, K&L GATES INSURANCE COVERAGE ALERT, NEWLY AMENDED CHINESE 
INSURANCE LAW, available at http://www.klgates.com/files/ Publication/3f725310-92b8-4066-b90b-
04a0241b2a48/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6c49e082-3a53-429d-899f-0e20e0a68103/12.17 
.09_Inscov Amended Chinese Insurance Law_Alert.pdf. 
 35. Press Release, CIRC, The CIRC Amended and Promulgated Provisions on the 
Administration of Insurance Companies, http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab456/i112034.htm (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2010) (on file with Washington University School of Law’s Global Studies Law 
Review). 
 36. DINGFU WU, ZHONGHUA RENMINGONHEGUO BAOXIANFA SHIYI [THE EXPLANATION OF THE 
INSURANCE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 399 (2009). 
 37. Insurance Law of the PRC (2009); see supra text accompanying note 30. 
 38. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(1) (2002) (China), available at http://www.lawinfo 
china.com/Law/list.asp. 
 39. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(2) (2002). 
 40. The term “personal insurance” is defined as “[a] type of insurance which takes the life and 
body of human beings as the subject matter insured.” See Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(3) (2009). 
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respect to property insurance shall have an insurable interest in the subject 
matter insured when the insured event occurs.
41
 This change has 
eliminated confusion created by the old law when “the party paying the 
premium and the party insured were not one and the same,” only the 
contractual party who pays the premium is entitled to claim the proceeds.
42
 
This argument tells only half of the story, as the original confusion should 
be traced back to the fundamental question—who should have the 
insurable interest? 
The purpose of property insurance is to reimburse the insured; any net 
gain in excess of reimbursement to the insured is against public policy.
43
 
This “principle of indemnity” is inseparable from the doctrine of insurable 
interest.
44
 In property insurance, the level of the insured’s loss determines 
the amount of payment recoverable under the policy, so that the insured is 
required to have an insurable interest to prove and calculate his loss.
45
 The 
old law requiring an applicant to have an insurable interest in the subject 
matter of the insurance appeared to presume that the applicant bears the 
loss on occurrence of the insured risk.  
According to the Insurance Law of 2002, the “applicant” is a person 
who signs the insurance contract with the insurer and pays the premiums.
46
 
The old law also regarded insurance as the payment of premiums by the 
applicant to the insurer with the insurer bearing responsibility to 
indemnify the applicant in case of loss. These two definitions created an 
illusion that the person who signs the contract and pays the premium shall 
have a legitimate right to the insurance claim. Under the old law, however, 
the applicant’s role was similar to that of the “insured” because the 
applicant’s entitlement to the claim depended on the applicant’s 
possession of the insurable interest rather than the duty to pay premiums. 
This insurable interest requirement made it possible for the applicant to 
suffer the loss without paying premiums. In the 2009 Amendment, the 
legislators attempted to solve this problem by clarifying the role of the 
applicant and the insured in property and life insurance respectively and 
by specifying who shall carry the insurable interest in both types of 
insurance. 
 
 
 41. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(2) (2009). 
 42. MONICA DANG, LOCKTON, INC., CHINA’S NEW INSURANCE LAW 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.lockton.com/Resource_/InsightPublication/976/China%20news_revised2.pdf. 
 43. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 135 (1988). 
 44. Id. 
 45. JOHN LOWRY & PHILLIP RAWLINGS, INSURANCE LAW: DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES 39 
(2000). 
 46. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(1) (2002). 
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Article 12 of the 2009 Amendment is similar to British and American 
common law. The insurable interest in property insurance refers to the 
insured’s economic relationship to the property, including at least property 
rights,
47
 contract rights,
48
 and legal liabilities. The insurable interest in life 
insurance is founded upon “the relations of parties to each other, either 
pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from 
the continuance of the life of the assured.”49  
Although the 2009 Amendment’s definition of insurable interest in 
both property and life insurance appeared to supplant the common law 
definition, more problems are created by Section 5 of Article 12. This 
section defines “the insured” as a person whose property, life, or body is 
covered by an insurance contract and who is entitled to claim the insurance 
proceeds.
50
 One issue with this definition is that the scope of an insurable 
interest in property insurance is not sufficiently inclusive. “Property” is 
anything that is owned by a person or entity: (1) real property refers to any 
interest in land, real estate, growing plants, or the improvements on it; and 
(2) personal property is everything else.
51
  
The term “property” in the 2009 Amendment does not cover property 
rights other than ownership; nor does it mention contractual rights or legal 
liabilities.
52
 Scholarly writings acknowledge a broader variety of types of 
insurable interest in property insurance, for example, various contractual 
rights and legal liabilities, and thereby interpret Article 12 as inclusive.
53
 
Given that courts in China, unlike those in common law countries, carry 
no law-making function, statutory laws and administrative rules serve as 
the source of law.
54
 The narrowly defined insurable interest in property 
insurance leads to the possibility of questioning the legitimacy of using 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., Brewster v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 274 So. 2d 213 (La. Ct. App. 1993) 
(stating that ownership qualifies an insurable interest). 
 48. See, e.g., Reid v. Hardware Mutual Ins. Co., 166 S.E.2d 317 (S.C. 1969) (indicating that a 
mortgagor has an insurable interest on the property insured). 
 49. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 775, 779 (1881). 
 50. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12 (5) (2009). 
 51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (9th ed. 2009) (defining personal property and real 
property).  
 52. Section 5 of Article 12 of the 2009 Amendment provides that “[a]n insured means a person 
whose property, life or body is covered by an insurance contract and who is entitled to claim the 
insurance money. An insurance applicant may be an insured.” Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(5) 
(2009). Such design of insurable interest also contradicts with Article 50 and 65 of the 2009 
Amendment, which provide basis for the sale of carrier insurance and liability insurance. For details, 
see id. arts. 50, 65. 
 53. See, e.g., Kevin X. Li, Tingzhong Fu, Ling Zhu & Yunlong Lin, Maritime Insurance Law in 
China, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 425, 446 (2008) (discussing the various types of property interest). 
 54. CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
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other property interests, contractual rights, or liabilities, although no one 
has yet done so.  
Another issue with the definition of “property” in the 2009 Amendment 
is that the subject matter of life insurance is unclear. Life insurance is 
purchased with the intent to protect the interest derived from the continuity 
of the life of the insured. The insured in life insurance, therefore, functions 
similarly to the subject matter in property insurance in that the property is 
the object to which the insurable interest attaches.
55
 Under the 2009 
Amendment, for the reason that it is the applicant who is required to hold 
the insurable interest, it is the applicant who seeks insurance coverage 
against the loss of the insured’s life. As such, under the 2009 Amendment, 
it is the applicant who seems to be the person truly covered by the life 
insurance policy. Also, in theory, “[n]o one expects to suffer pecuniary 
loss as a result of one’s own death.”56 Thus, Section 5 of Article 12 is 
problematic in two respects: (1) the insured, having no insurable interest, 
should not be the person “actually” covered under a life insurance policy; 
and (2) if the death of the insured is the risk covered by a life insurance 
policy, leaving the lingering question as to when a decedent who sustains 
no loss by the statutory definition is entitled to insurance proceeds.  
In practice, at least in life insurance, the insured cannot and should not 
be the person to make the claim. Modern life insurance policies endow a 
policyholder, who could be the applicant, the right to name and change the 
beneficiary regardless of the identity of the primary beneficiary or the 
contingent beneficiary.
57
 In the absence of a qualified designated 
beneficiary, the estate of the insured receives the proceeds.
58
 Although 
Articles 40 to 42 of the Insurance Law of 2009 explain that the applicant 
or the insured has the right to designate the beneficiary and the entitlement 
of the insured’s heirs to the insurance proceeds, there is undoubted conflict 
between Article 12 and these two articles.
59
  
The Japanese Insurance Law, however, defines “insured” under 
different circumstances. In indemnity insurance, the insured refers to the 
person whose loss will be indemnified under the contract.
60
 In life 
 
 
 55. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 296. 
 56. ROBERT JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 43 (2d ed. 1996). 
 57. Id. at 284. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 40 (2009) (“The insured or insurance applicant may 
designate one or more beneficiaries . . . .”); see also id. art. 42  (2009) (“After the death of the insured, 
under any of the following circumstances, the insurance money shall be deemed as the legacy of the 
insured, and the insurer shall perform the obligation of paying insurance money according to the 
Inheritance Law of the People’s Republic of China.”). 
 60. See Japan Insurance Law (2008). 
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insurance, the insured is the person whose death triggers the insured’s duty 
to pay proceeds.
61
 In health insurance, the insured is the person whose 
illness obligates the insurer to compensate his medical expenses.
62
 The 
Japanese commentators’ unanimous agreement that the existence of the 
insurable interest is to identify and measure losses, supports the notion that 
the insured is the holder of the insurable interest under a property or 
liability insurance policy.
63
 The Japanese law also clearly addresses the 
status of the insured under life or health insurance policies.
64
 Such 
legislation provides a possible solution for eliminating the present Article 
12 confusion in the PRC’s 2009 Amendment. 
2. The Time When an Insurable Interest Must Exist 
While the old law was not explicit on this matter, the 2009 Amendment 
stipulates the timing of when an insurable interest must exist. In property 
insurance, the insured must have an insurable interest at the time of loss, 
while in life insurance, the applicant should have an insurable interest at 
the time of the contract formation.
65
  
The language added in the 2009 Amendment is consistent with the 
majority opinion in common law courts, such as the American courts. The 
opinions from the majority of the American courts hold that insurance on 
property is valid when an insurable interest in the property exists at the 
time of the loss. The rationale is that if the loss only occurs to the insured 
with an insurable interest in the damaged property, then no loss can exist 
when the property lacks the prerequisite insurable interest at the time of 
loss.
66
 An incentive for the property’s destruction is also less likely to exist 
 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Japan Insurance Law, art. 2(4) (2008). 
 63. KUNEO FUKUDA & EKO FURUTEKI, KASEI BAKENHOU [Amended Insurance Law] 20 (2009); 
TOMONOHU YAMASHITA ET AL., BAKENHOU [Insurance Law] 83 (3d ed. 2010). 
 64. See Japan Insurance Law (2008). 
 65. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 12(1)-(2)  (2009). 
 66. E.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 292 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D. Iowa 1968) (finding 
insurers could not deny coverage on grounds that insured, who was listed as owner, had no insurable 
interest because, even though the insured’s son-in-law possessed the car and the insured intended to 
transfer ownership to son-in-law when insured received payment, a bona fide sale had not occurred at 
time of loss); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Seaboard Homes, Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1965) (“[W]here builder agreed with lessor that title to building which builder had constructed on 
lessor’s land would vest in lessor if building was not removed by certain date and building was not 
removed by such date, title to property was in lessor and builder had no ‘insurable interest’ in house 
when house was destroyed by fire after agreed date for removal.”); Stauder v. Associated Gen. Fire 
Ins. Co., 151 N.E.2d 583, 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957) (“[A] father of minor children charged by court 
order with payment of money for their support subject to the further order of the court had an 
‘insurable interest’ in the children’s clothing as well as the furniture and household goods used by his 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] COMMENTARIES ON THE INSURANCE LAW OF CHINA 759 
 
 
 
 
if the person has an insurable interest at the time of loss.
67
 For life 
insurance, however, the general rule for most American courts declares 
that an insurable interest for all types of life insurance must exist only at 
the time the life insurance contract was formed, and the lack of any 
insurable interest at the time of the insured’s death is irrelevant and 
immaterial in the absence of a contrary contractual provision or state 
statute.
68
 This American common law rule also takes into consideration the 
possibility of the termination of the insurable interest in life insurance 
based either on the dissolution of the pecuniary interest, such as 
partnership, or family relationship, such as marriage.
69
 
Although the 2009 Amendment follows the majority rule of common 
law courts, neither section regarding the timing of the existence of the 
insurable interest is flawless. With respect to property insurance, the 
insurance interest must exist at the time of loss, but common law courts 
have never reached a consensus on whether the insurable interest must 
exist at the time of contract formation. Indeed, numerous cases, including 
the historic English case Sadlers Co. v. Badcock,
70
 have held that the 
insured must have an insurable interest in property both at the time of 
contract formation and at the time of loss. Some argue against the ruling in 
Sadlers Co.: 
[I]n most cases where the Sadlers Co. rule is applied, an insurable 
interest either exists both at the time of insuring and the time of 
loss, or at neither time. Thus, the confusion about the rule normally 
makes no practical difference in outcomes. In those cases where the 
rule matters, most courts have examined the rule carefully and 
decided only to require an insurable interest at the time of loss.
71
 
 
 
divorced wife in the care, custody and control of the children so as to be entitled to maintain an action 
on a fire policy for the loss.”). 
 67. JERRY, supra note 56, at 255. 
 68. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876) (“[A] life insurance 
policy taken out in good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the insurable 
interest, unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of the policy itself.”); Speroni v. Speroni, 
92 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ill. 1950) (“Where the insurer recognizes the policy as valid and pays into court the 
proceeds thereof, a third person, such as the personal representative of the insured, cannot take 
advantage of the want of insurable interest.”); Secor v. Pioneer Foundry Co., 173 N.W.2d 780, 782 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (“Public policy against speculation on life of another did not prohibit husband’s 
former employer, which had been applicant for, and owner and beneficiary of, ordinary life policy on 
husband, and which had paid premiums on such policy, from retaining insurance on husband after 
termination of employment or beyond date that first premium became due after such termination.”).  
 69. JERRY, supra note 56, at 256. 
 70. Sadlers Co. v. Badcock, 2 Atk. 544, 26 ER 733 (1743). 
 71. JERRY, supra note 56, at 255. 
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The rationale is that the requirement of an insurable interest in property 
insurance provides disincentives to using insurance as a method of 
wagering, specifically, incurring losses in the expectation of an insurance 
recovery.
72
 It makes more sense, however, for the court to deny recovery 
to someone who has taken out a policy without interest or expectation of 
interest as well as those who subsequently obtained an interest for the 
purpose of wagering.
73
 The majority rule fails to counter the danger 
generated by gambling and provides no additional protection for legitimate 
interests.
74
 
In addition, the premium is recognized as an insurer’s consideration for 
assuming the insured’s risk in exchange for the insurer’s obligation to pay 
proceeds.
75
 Typically, policyholders must pay premiums before coverage 
begins.
76
 The consideration may fail, however, if the insurer assumes no 
risk at the time premiums are paid because, even though the insurer 
promises to insure against the risk of loss, the insured risk does not exist 
until the insured actually obtains the insurable interest. Thus, during the 
period that the insured holds no insurable interest in the property, the 
insurer does not seem to have legitimate grounds to retain the premium 
because its promise is contingent upon the insured’s acquisition of an 
insurable interest, which may not happen during the effective period of the 
contract.
77
 Given that the insurable interest is an essential element for the 
valuable consideration of an insured’s payment of premium, requiring its 
existence only at the time of loss materially therefore conflicts with the 
general principle of contract law. 
As for life insurance, advocates of the majority rule present four 
primary arguments. First, substantial amounts of life insurance have been 
marketed as investment contracts rather than as contracts of indemnity. 
The majority rule requiring an insurable interest for life insurance only at 
the formation of the contract facilitates the liquidity of such investments.
78
 
Second, “there apparently was, and perhaps continues to be, a strong sense 
of protecting the integrity of the life insurance transaction in terms of both 
preserving the contractual freedom of the parties and assuring the stability 
 
 
 72. MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 36 (2007); KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 136. 
 73. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 155 (quoting EDWIN PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF 
INSURANCE LAW 133 (Ralph H. Blanchard ed., 2d ed. 1957)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. AVERY W. KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210 (1998). See also 
JERRY, supra note 56, at 16. 
 76. CLARKE, supra note 72, at 132; JERRY, supra note 56, at 510. 
 77. CLARKE, supra note 72, at 133. 
 78. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 152. 
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of the contractual commitment.”79 Third, life insurance is often purchased 
for the benefit of relatives and spouses. Some familial relationships, such 
as those between parents and children, do not change with the passage of 
time.
80
 Even though the spousal relationship may terminate in divorce, a 
pecuniary relationship usually survives the dissolution of the marriage. 
This pecuniary relationship is sufficient to satisfy the insurable interest 
requirement.
81
 Fourth, insurers continue to pay the full amount of the 
policy even when the interest had extinguished.
82
 “In short, life insurance 
‘[c]ustom conquered the law,’ and the underlying reason for not requiring 
an insurable interest at the time of the insured’s death was actually 
founded on a life insurance marketing scheme.”83 
Several responses to these arguments have been presented by 
commentators who assert that an insurable interest in the life of another 
must exist both at the inception of the life insurance contract and at the 
time of the insured’s death. First, various forms of life insurance, 
including partnership life insurance policies, key employee life insurance 
policies, creditor-debtor life insurance policies, and other business-related 
life insurance policies, also possess important indemnity aspects.
84
 
Second, “a court generally does have the right, and the obligation, to 
review an insurance contract to determine whether or not such a contract is 
unconscionable or violates state public policy, including whether or not it 
constitutes an illegal wagering contract.”85 Third, “an absolute divorce 
generally terminates this love and affection insurable interest between ex-
spouses absent other valid economic interests such as spousal support and 
child support obligations.”86 In this case, the moral hazard significantly 
increases as the ex-spouse, who is the primary beneficiary in a pre-existing 
life insurance policy, may murder a former spouse in order to recover the 
insurance proceeds.
87
 This rationale, however, is an apparent wagering 
contract issue.
88
 
 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 151. 
 81. JERRY, supra note 56, at 256. 
 82. Peter N. Swisher, Insurance Law Annual: Article: The Insurable Interest Requirement for 
Life Insurance: A Critical Reassessment, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 477, 526 (2005) (quoting PATTERSON, 
supra note 73, at 163).  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 525. 
 85. Id. at 526. 
 86. Id. at 524–25. 
 87. Id. at 525. 
 88. Id. 
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Indeed, where life insurance involves the function of indemnity, the 
insured can only be “put back to the position he or she would have been in 
had the loss not occurred. . . .”89 Since the insurable interest in indemnity 
insurance determines whether the insured has the expectation of loss,
90
 it is 
required to exist at the time of loss, and, in the present case, at the death of 
the insured.  
Insurance with no indemnity function, however, raises unique issues. 
Studies have revealed that being insured against the risk of being 
considered high risk reduces the incentive to exert preventive efforts to 
decrease the probability of greater risk.
91
 Similarly, a wagering contract is 
unquestionably riskier than a contract with an insurable interest, which 
discourages the use of insurance as a device of wagering and removes the 
incentive for the procurer of the insurance to destroy the insured person or 
property.
92
 Allowing an insurance policy’s effect to continue after the 
extinction of the insurable interest is inconsistent with the doctrine of 
insurable interests. In addition, insurance of any type functions as 
financing risk through the application of the law of large numbers to 
achieve the goal of risk distribution.
93
 Arguments that emphasize 
investment through life insurance while ignoring the basic risk distribution 
function of insurance are confusing and may ultimately prove unsound. 
Both German and Japanese legislators endorsed the principle that the 
insurable interest must exist through the entire duration of the insurance 
contract. Article 80 of the German Insurance Contract Act provides that 
“[t]he policyholder shall not be obligated to pay the insurance premium if 
no insured interest exists when the insurance cover[age] commences.”94 
“If the insured interest ceases to exist once the insurance cover[age] 
commences, the insurer shall be entitled to the premium to which he 
would have been entitled if the insurance had only been applied up until 
the time when the insurer learned of the cessation of the interest.”95 “If the 
policyholder has insured a non-existent interest with the intention of 
thereby gaining an illegal pecuniary benefit, the contract shall be void; the 
insurer shall be entitled to the premium paid up until the time when he 
 
 
 89. LOWRY & RAWLINGS, supra note 45, at 179. 
 90. CLARKE, supra note 72, at 32. 
 91. Renaud Bourles, Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance, Classification and Prepayment 2, 
INSTITUT D’ ECONOMIE PUBLIQUE (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.idep-fr.org/IMG/pdf/Bourles.pdf. 
 92. JERRY, supra note 56, at 236. 
 93. EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERSE VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 39 
(9th ed. 2003). 
 94. VVG, supra note 7, § 80(1) (2008). 
 95. Id. § 80(2). 
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learns of the circumstances establishing the nullity.”96 With respect to 
Japan, the insurable interest is required both at the time of the contract 
formation and the occurrence of the insured event.
97
  
Unless the moral hazard prevention mechanism is inlaid in the Chinese 
Insurance Law, the Sadlers Co. rule and similar rules applied by German 
and Japanese law appear to better facilitate the function of the insurable 
interest. 
B. The Duty of Disclosure 
Article 16 of the 2009 Amendment governs an insured’s duty of 
disclosure and introduced several significant changes to the old law: 
(1) the scope of the duty, (2) elements of breach of the duty, (3) the 
incontestability provision, and (4) the return of premium after the 
rescission of contract.
98
  
1. The Scope of the Duty of Disclosure 
With regard to the scope of the insured’s duty to disclose, the old law 
provided that the insurer may raise inquiries on matters concerning the 
insured or the subject matter of insurance, and the insured was obliged to 
make true representations.
99
 The 2009 Amendment, however, limited the 
scope of the insured’s duty: “where the insurer makes any inquiry about 
the subject matter or about the insured when entering into an insurance 
contract, the insurance applicant shall tell the truth.”100 The 2009 
Amendment unequivocally confines the insured’s duty of making true 
representations to the inquiries posed by the insurer. Moreover, the insured 
bores the duty only until the formation of the contract.
101
 
The Insurance Law after the 2009 Amendment, imposing only the duty 
of true representation per the insurer’s questions, omits the insured’s duty 
to disclose facts material to the determination of the insurability and the 
risk. British and American common law, however, distinguish the terms 
“non-disclosure” and “misrepresentation.” While non-disclosure usually 
refers to a situation “where no answer has been volunteered to the insurer 
because no specific question was asked,” misrepresentation “describe[s] 
 
 
 96. VVG, supra note 7, § 80(3) (2008). 
 97. YAMASHITA ET AL., supra note 63, at 105–06. 
 98. WU, supra note 36, at 402–03. 
 99. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 17(1) (2002). 
 100. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16(1) (2009). 
 101. WU, supra note 36, at 44. 
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situations where the wrong or misleading answer has been given to 
questions posed of the applicant for insurance.”102  
The purpose of the duty of disclosure, based on the implied duty of 
utmost good faith, is to assist the insurer in its risk assessment. 
Considering its underlying purpose, the duty of disclosure should continue 
throughout the negotiation and at least until the contract has been 
completed.
103
  
Holding both non-disclosure and misrepresentations as violations of the 
duty of good faith increases the clarity of British and American common 
law in hopes to accomplish the underlying purpose of the duty. Under 
British and American common law, the duty of disclosure applies to 
negotiations preceding the conclusion of the contract, and full disclosure 
of any material fact affecting the risk in question should be made up to the 
time when a binding contract is concluded.
104
 Thus, an insured is required 
“to advise the insurer of such matters that he knows might influence the 
insurer in accepting or declining the risk, at least where such facts are not 
a matter of record and not discoverable by the insurer.”105 Beyond making 
a true representation in an application, the insured must maintain his 
truthfulness until the delivery of the policy, and he must therefore use due 
diligence to communicate to the insurer facts materially affecting the risks 
that arise after the application has been made but before the contract is 
formed.
106
 Otherwise, the insurer is likely to bear the increased risk during 
the underwriting period.  
German law addresses the duty of disclosure somewhat similarly. 
German law provides that if, between receipt of the policyholder’s 
application and acceptance of the contract, the insurer asks such questions 
relevant to the insurer’s decision to conclude the contract, the policyholder 
shall also fulfill the duty of disclosure as it applies to these questions.
107
 
The 2009 Amendment, which lightened an insured’s duty of disclosure, 
may result in difficulty classifying risk, ultimately leading to adverse 
selection.
108
 It also creates the possibility that an applicant might conceal 
or misrepresent material risks at the time of application and contend that 
 
 
 102. RAY HODGIN, INSURANCE LAW 173 (1998). 
 103. SEMIN PARK, THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE IN INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW 59 (1996). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. E.g., United Sav. Life Ins. Co. v. Coulson, 560 S.W. 2d 211, 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); 
MacKenzie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 411 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1969). 
 107. VVG, § 19(1) (2008). 
 108. For details, see SCOTT E. HARRINGTON & GREGORY R. NIEHAUS, RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
INSURANCE 115–19 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2011] COMMENTARIES ON THE INSURANCE LAW OF CHINA 765 
 
 
 
 
such risks arose only after the application. Such a scenario is inconsistent 
with the principle of utmost good faith.
109
  
The principle of utmost good faith is intended to correct a lack of 
equity in knowledge and sources of information available between the 
parties.
110
 Therefore, the duty of disclosure should remain intact for both 
parties until the contract is agreed upon to put the insurer on an equitable 
footing with the insured.
111
  
2. Elements of the Breach of the Duty of Disclosure 
The old law was clear on the elements of the breach of the duty of 
disclosure. The old law noted three situations that constituted breach: (1) 
the insured intentionally concealing facts, (2) the insured refusing to 
perform the duty of true representations, or (3) the insured failing to fulfill 
the duty of true representations due to negligence.
112
 Additionally, the 
Insurance Law of 2002 specified that a breach could only be sustained 
where the violation was sufficient to affect the insurer’s decision to 
provide insurance or increase the premium.
113
  
Although the 2009 Amendment retains most parts of this section, it 
further restricts breaches to those in which the insured failed to make true 
representations “intentionally or [through] gross negligence.”114 It also 
explicitly restricts the insurer’s right to rescind the contract when the 
insurer is aware of the truth of the insured’s misrepresentation.115 
Compared to the 2009 Amendment, except for the similarity in 
defining materiality, the U.S. does not regard the insured’s intention as 
irrelevant in sustaining the misrepresentation.
116
 In the U.S., three 
 
 
 109. The rationale of the application of the doctrine of utmost good faith is that  
[i]nsurance is a contract of speculation. The special facts upon which the contingent chance is 
to be computed lie most commonly in the knowledge of the assured only; the underwriter 
trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge to mislead the underwriter into a belief that the circumstance 
does not exist. . . . Good faith forbids either party, by concealing what he privately knows, to 
draw the other into a bargain from his ignorance of the fact, and his believing the contrary. 
LAWRY & RAWLINGS, supra note 45, at 73–74 (quoting Carter v. Boehm, (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1909). 
 110. Id. 
 111. PETER M. EGGERS & PATRICK FOSS, GOOD FAITH AND INSURANCE CONTRACTS 43, 45–46 
(1998) (citing Looker v. Law Union and Rock Ins. Co., [1928] 1 K.B. 554, 559–60 (per Acton, J.)). 
 112. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 17(2) (2002). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16(2) (2009). 
 115. Id. art. 16(6). 
 116. Clafin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 81, 83 (1884) (“All fraud or [attempt at fraud by] 
false swearing shall cause a forfeiture of all claims on the insurers, and shall be a full bar to all 
remedies against the insurer on the policy.”).  
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conditions must be met to constitute misrepresentation: (1) the 
representation is untrue, (2) the information is material either to the 
insurer’s decision to insure or to the terms of the insurance contract, and 
(3) the insurer actually relies on the incorrect information.
117
 To reduce the 
insured’s burden of disclosure, the 2009 Amendment excludes the untrue 
statement made due to negligence from the scope of “misrepresentation” 
regardless of the materiality of the statement to the risk assessment.
118
 
Such an arrangement is not entirely without grounds. In the U.S., a few 
courts have ruled that an applicant for insurance cannot willfully intend to 
deceive a potential insurer unless the applicant has actual knowledge that 
the misrepresentation is untrue; proving constructive knowledge will not 
suffice in such courts.
119
  
Most courts, however, still approve insurers’ defense to coverage if the 
misrepresentation is material, regardless of the intention of the insured or 
the applicant.
120
 The objective of the duty of disclosure is to ensure the 
accuracy of a prudent insurer’s decision in computing the risk to be 
undertaken, so information pertaining to a proposed risk must be disclosed 
by an insured to allow an insurer to assess the risk properly.
121
 Therefore, 
 
 
 117. See, e.g., Crawford v. Standard Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 583, 586 (Or. App. 1980) (“An insurer 
may show it approved the policy in the ordinary course of business which, when coupled with proof 
that the application contains false representations but for which the insurer would not have issued the 
policy and the insurer’s legal right to rely on the application information, is sufficient to make out 
prima facie the element of reasonable reliance.”); see also JERRY, supra note 56, at 682–88. 
 118. WU, supra note 36, at 45. Article 16 of the 2009 amendment provides that “Where the 
insurance applicant fails to perform the obligation of truthful representation . . . intentionally or for 
gross negligence . . . the insurer shall have the right to rescind the insurance contract.” Insurance Law 
of the PRC, art. 16 (2009). Accordingly, first, the violation of the obligation of “truthful 
representation” includes both the non-disclosure and misrepresentation; second, only “intentional” and 
“gross negligence” are elements of constituting misrepresentation. See id. General negligence was 
excluded. 
 119. See, e.g., Parsaie v. United Olympic Life Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 219, 221 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A] 
cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing exists when the insurer wrongfully 
cancels an insurance policy without a reasonable basis.” (quoting Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 
889 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. 1994))); Kuhns v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. 147 A. 76, 77 (Pa. 1929) (“[A] 
forfeiture [of an insurance contract] does not follow where there has been no deliberate intent to 
deceive, and the known falsity of the answer is not affirmatively shown.”); KEETON & WIDISS, supra 
note 43, at 573. 
 120. See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Long, 266 So. 2d 780, 783 (Ala. Civ. App. 1972) 
(“Insurance companies are entitled to candid and truthful answers, and when such candor is withheld 
and involves matters material to the risk, no just complaint can be raised, when, in after investigations, 
the falsity is discovered and the policies issued in reliance upon the truthfulness of the statements, are 
avoided.”); Elfstrom v. N.Y. Life. Ins. Co., 432 P.2d 731, 739 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (finding that an 
insurer of a group insurance, despite the knowledge of the employer, may avoid a policy where the 
employee misrepresents material facts in the application to the employer acting as the agent of the 
insurer).  
 121. POH CHU CHAI, GENERAL INSURANCE LAW 68 (2009). 
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so long as the information is sufficient to affect the insurer’s decision on 
the applicant’s insurability, risk classification, and the premium associated 
with the level of risk, the falsity of such information will result in adverse 
selection and subsidization. Such subsidization may ultimately discourage 
ordinary people from using insurance as a tool of risk management.
122
 
Whether the misrepresentation is intentional makes no difference. As far 
as insurance contracts are concerned, most courts hold that “the making of 
any material misrepresentation, whether innocent or not, violates the 
utmost good faith and constitutes a breach of duty at law.”123 
If the central philosophy of the 2009 Amendment on the insured’s duty 
of disclosure is to mitigate the insured’s responsibility in 
misrepresentation, it makes sense that the 2009 Amendment includes a 
section regarding the insurer’s waiver of the right to rescind the contract. 
For the insurer to avoid the coverage, U.S. courts require the insurer to 
prove that its reliance was reasonable.
124
 Where an insurer investigates and 
learns the truth of the facts submitted before issuing the policy, there will 
obviously be no reliance on the original information in issuing the 
policy.
125
 Oftentimes, insurers may urge the applicant to submit to medical 
examination by a physician designated by the insurer. The medical 
examination permits the insured to identify health conditions inconsistent 
with the insured’s disclosure before approval of the application.126 The 
addition of the “reliance” element eliminates the possibility of an insurer 
relying on the misrepresentation if he knows the truth of the 
misrepresented statement.
127
 The 2009 Amendment includes the 
equivalent of the admirable reliance element in Section 6 of Article 16. 
The German Insurance Contract Act and the Japanese Insurance Law also 
carry similar provisions.
128
 
 
 
 122. HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 108, at 118. 
 123. EGGERS & FOSS, supra note 111, § 4.28. 
 124. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Price, 396 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) 
(“[Insurer] had no notice that the information obtained from [the insured] was false; therefore it was 
entitled to rely on this information in issuing its policy and had no duty to investigate the truthfulness 
of the application. Only where the insurer has sufficient information to give rise to a reason to doubt 
the representations made is there an obligation to investigate or make further inquiry.”). 
 125. JERRY, supra note 56, at 689. 
 126. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW 196–96 (3d ed. 1996). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See VVG, § 19(4) (2008) (“The insurer’s right to withdraw from the contract on account of 
grossly negligent breach of the duty of disclosure and his right to terminate the contract . . . shall be 
ruled out if he would also have concluded the contract in the knowledge of the facts which were not 
disclosed, albeit with other conditions.”); Japan Insurance Law, arts. 28(II), 59(II), 84(II) (“Where the 
insurer is aware of the undisclosed or misrepresented facts or unaware due to its negligence, the 
insurer forfeits its right of contract rescission.”). 
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3. The Incontestability Provision 
The third change the 2009 Amendment made to the duty of disclosure 
was the addition of the incontestability provision. The new Section 3 of 
Article 16 provides that the insurer’s right to rescind the contract upon an 
insured’s misrepresentation shall be cancelled at the first of (1) at least 
thirty days from the day when the insurer knows the cause of rescission, or 
(2) at least two years from the date of contract formation.
129
 The United 
States acknowledges the incontestability clause: 
[The incontestability clause gives] the insurance company . . . an 
adequate window of time in which to investigate an application for 
life insurance so as to discover any material misrepresentation on 
the part of the applicant. Second, it protects the insured from having 
to defend against a possibly specious challenge long after 
acquisition of the policy. Thus, by requiring prompt investigation of 
statements made in an insurance application, the clause furthers the 
public policy of denying protection to those who make fraudulent 
claims. The “during the lifetime” wording is part of that public 
policy. If the insured dies of a serious illness a short time after 
obtaining a life insurance policy, the insurance company should be 
permitted to investigate in contemplation of a challenge.
130
 
The 2009 Amendment prevents the insurer from lulling the insured into a 
false sense of security for the purpose of receiving premiums and 
postponing the issue, possibly until after the death of the insured. 
4. Return of Premiums After Contract Rescission  
Both the 2009 Amendment and the Insurance Law of 2002 endowed 
the insurer with the right to rescind the contract when the applicant makes 
an untrue misrepresentation, either intentionally or as a result of gross 
negligence.
131
 Sections 3 and 4 of Article 16 of the 2009 Amendment set 
out the insurer’s right to retain insurance premiums after rescission. The 
new law mandates that the insurer shall not refund the insurance premiums 
where the insurance applicant intentionally failed to make true 
 
 
 129. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16(3) (2009). 
 130. Crow v. Capitol Bankers Life Ins. Co., 891 P.2d 1206, 1212 (N.M. 1995) (citing Maxwell v. 
Cumberland Life Ins. Co., 748 P.2d 392, 395 (Idaho 1987)). 
 131. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16 (2009); Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 17 (2002). See also 
WU, supra note 36, at 402–03 (2009). 
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representations, but the insurer shall refund the insurance premiums where 
the applicant violated his obligation due to gross negligence.
132
  
As for the rationale of not returning the premiums, commentators in 
China explain that the purpose of withholding the refund is to punish the 
dishonest applicant, similar to punitive damages.
133
 This argument is 
unpersuasive for several reasons.  
First, punitive damages are “money damages awarded to a plaintiff in a 
private civil action, in addition to and apart from compensatory damages, 
assessed against a defendant guilty of flagrantly violating the plaintiff’s 
rights.”134 They are commonly awarded in tort litigation, particularly 
corporate litigation such as product liability litigation or antitrust 
litigation.
135
 In practice, punitive damages are “quasi-criminal”136 and are 
remedies common in statutes regulating enterprises because imprisonment 
of corporations is impossible.
137
 The rationale for punitive damages is less 
applicable to non-corporate defendants. Thus, it is a false analogy to argue 
that a “confiscated premium” is a punitive damage resulting from the 
insured’s misrepresentation to an insurer’s single inquiry.  
Second, the rationalization that intentional misrepresentations 
adversely impact the insurer’s risk assessment applies to unintentional 
misrepresentations as well. If the insured’s misrepresentation of material 
facts, either intentionally or through gross negligence, has an equally 
adverse impact on the insurer’s risk assessment, then what is the rationale 
 
 
 132. Insurance Law of the PRC, arts. 16(3)–(4) (2009). 
 133. CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 103. 
 134. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. 
REV. 363, 364 (1994). 
 135. Id. at 371. 
 136. Id. at 365. 
 137. The Restrictive Rule manifested in Section 909 of the Second Restatement of Torts provides 
bases for courts to award punitive damages against corporations. See Christopher R. Green, Punishing 
Corporations: The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 NEB. L. 
REV. 197, 205–08 (2008). The Restatement states  
[p]unitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal because of an 
act by an agent if, but only if, (a) the principal or the managerial agent authorized the doing 
and the manner of the act, or (b) the agent was unfit and the principal or managerial agent was 
reckless in employing him, or (c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was 
acting in the scope of employment, or (d) [the employer or a manager of the employer] 
ratified or approved the act. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). In an analysis of the twenty-four jurisdictions that 
have adopted verbatim or variations of the law in Section 909, Professor Christopher Green argued 
that “[t]here is no good reason for criminal law and punitive damages to punish corporations using 
different rules . . . . Courts assessing either corporate criminal liability or the assessment of punitive 
damages against a corporation would be well-served to consider both fields at once.” Chris Green, 
Punishing Corporations: The Food-Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law, 87 
NEB. L. REV. 197, 206–08, 269 (2008). 
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for permitting the refund under the gross-negligence circumstance?
138
 The 
argument praising this provision has failed to answer this question.
139
  
Third, denying refunds of premiums ignores the dual character of 
savings and insurance in life insurance policies. Under a whole life 
insurance policy, a large portion of the premium payments in the early 
years are accumulated as savings of the policyholder.
140
 Where the 
policyholder surrenders the policy, he is entitled to receive most of his 
prepayments back in the form of the policy’s cash surrender value.141 
Since Section 3 of Article 16 of the 2009 Amendment does not rule out its 
application to life insurance, it is unjustifiable to allow the insurer to seize 
the policyholder’s savings because such seizure is inconsistent with how 
life insurance operates.  
Likewise, under traditional contract principles, “[a]n insured is 
basically entitled to a return of premium where there has been a total 
failure of consideration . . . .”142 The common law rule required a refund of 
the insurance premium in the event of prospective cancellation and of the 
entire policy in the event of rescission.
143
 As rescinding a contract renders 
a contract void,
144
 the insurer would assume no insured risk and obligation 
for paying the proceeds as if the contract was never formed. Pursuant to 
the “no risk no premium” principle, the insurer suffers no detriment for 
retaining the premiums
145
 and the consideration, therefore, fails. In 
particular, rescission is retroactive and puts parties in status quo ante and 
restores things so that the insurer is not liable for claims incurred between 
the formation of the contract and the moment of avoidance and, therefore, 
 
 
 138. Compare Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16(3) (2009) (permitting the insurance company to 
retain the premiums if the insured intentionally fails to perform her obligation of telling the truth), with 
Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 16(4) (2009) (requiring the insurance company to refund the premiums 
if the applicant fails to perform her obligation of telling the truth due to gross negligence).  
 139. See generally CHONGMIAO & LI, supra note 5, at 103–05; JIANG AN, ZHONGHWA 
RENMINGONGHEGUO BAOXIANFA SHIYI [Explanation of Insurance Law of the PRC] 44 (2009) 
(providing no analysis as to the different refund policies for intentional misrepresentations and grossly 
negligent misrepresentations).  
 140. HARRINGTON & NIEHAUS, supra note 108, at 598. 
 141. Id. 
 142. JOHN BIRDS, MODERN INSURANCE LAW 179 (7th ed. 2007) (citing Tyrie v. Fletcher, (1777) 2 
Cowp. 666). 
 143. See, e.g., Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Kammerer, 327 N.W.2d 618, 620–21 (Neb. 1982) (“Insurer is 
precluded from asserting a forfeiture where, after acquiring knowledge of the facts constituting a 
breach of condition, it has retained the unearned portion of the premium or has failed to return or 
tender it back with reasonable promptness, especially where the nature of the breach or ground for 
forfeiture is of such character as to render the policy void from its inception . . . .”). 
 144. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1420 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “rescind” as “1. To abrogate or 
cancel (a contract) unilaterally or by agreement.”). 
 145. MALCOLM A. CLARKE, THE LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 314 (2d ed. 1994). 
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must return the premium.
146
 Such rule was effectuated in the British 
Marine Insurance Act of 1906, which provides that “[w]here the 
consideration for the payment of the premium totally fails, and there has 
been no fraud or illegality on the part of the assured or his agents, the 
premium is thereupon returnable to the assured.”147 The permission for the 
insurer to “confiscate” the premiums after the rescission of the contract in 
the 2009 Amendment violates the general rule of contract law.  
C. The Interpretation of Contract 
1. Interpretation in Favor of the Insured 
Article 31 of the Insurance Law of 2002 provided that disputes as to 
the meaning of terms or clauses should be construed in favor of the 
insured and beneficiary.
148
 Although Article 31 appears to conform to the 
principles of the ambiguity doctrine in spirit, the legislation proves 
problematic.
149
 Article 31, sweeping in scope, grants a uniformly favorable 
interpretation to insured persons or beneficiaries without recognizing that 
ambiguity exists. As a result, a clause or term is automatically construed 
against the insurer in situations where no ambiguity exists. Certainly, 
Article 31 is to the advantage of the insured or the beneficiary. Where the 
insured or beneficiary is obviously in the wrong, however, application of 
this law appears unfair to the insurer while granting a windfall to the 
insured. Having noticed such a loophole, legislators drafting the 2009 
Amendment attempted to seal it by imposing the conditions under which it 
could be applied to ambiguous terms. Article 30 of the new law states that 
in disputes over any clause of an insurance contract using the insurer’s 
standard clauses, the clause shall be interpreted as its commonly 
understood meaning.
150
 Similar to the old law, however, the new law 
further states that where two parties attach different interpretations to a 
 
 
 146. Id. at 609–10. 
 147. Marine Insurance Act, 1906 6 Edw., c. 41 § 84, sched. 1. 
 148. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 31 (2002). 
 149. When a contract is deemed “adhesive,” courts are more active in policing the bargain to 
counterbalance the potential detriment to the weaker parties so that all ambiguities should be construed 
against the insurer. Insurers who tailor sophisticated wordings in the policy must bear the burden of 
any resulting confusion. See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 
1947); see also KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 628; BIRDS, supra note 142, at 228 (citing 
English v. Western, [1940] 2 K.B. 156). 
 150. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 30(1) (2009). Zhengyi, the Chinese term for ambiguity, does 
not explicitly appear in the law, however, the description in the law is clearly the definition of 
ambiguity. See id. 
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clause, it should be interpreted in favor of the insured and the 
beneficiary.
151
 
Although the 2009 Amendment balanced some inequities, it did not 
cure all of the issues in the old law. Both limiting the application of the 
ambiguity rule to the standardized policy form, like adhesion contracts, 
and stating how to interpret ambiguous terms by providing a literal 
description undoubtedly made the interpretation rule in the Insurance Law 
of 2009 more reasonable and consistent with the international standards.
152
 
The 2009 Amendment, however, fails to address the insured’s reasonable 
expectation.  
The reasonable expectation doctrine is multi-functional and can serve 
to increase predictable interpretations in insurance contracts. In some 
cases, the reasonable expectation doctrine applies when an ambiguity 
exists.
153
 The doctrine also functions as a rule of interpretation where the 
principle of resolving ambiguities in a contract against the drafter is not an 
adequate explanation for the coverage issues in which no ambiguity 
exists.
154
 Insurance contracts should provide the coverage that either the 
insured reasonably believed she purchased or that a reasonable person in 
the place of the insured would expect after reading the policy.
155
 Once the 
doctrine is applied, two results occur: (1) an insurer will be denied any 
unconscionable advantage in an insurance transaction, and (2) “[t]he 
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended 
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored 
even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations.”156  
 
 
 151. Id. art. 30(2). 
 152. WU, supra note 36, at 80–81. The term “ambiguity” in contract law is generally defined as 
“[a]n uncertainty of meaning or intention, as in a contractual term or statutory provision.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 2009) (“In ordinary language this term is often confined to situation in 
which the same word is capable of meaning two different things . . . .”). This general definition of 
“ambiguity” aligns with the definition in Insurance Law of the PRC (2009). See supra note 150 and 
accompanying text. 
 153. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d. 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The court will 
not artificially create ambiguity where none exists. If a reasonable interpretation favors the insurer and 
any other interpretation would be strained, no compulsion exists to torture or twist the language of the 
policy. . . . Coverage will also be found if the insured can demonstrate through extrinsic evidence that 
its expectation of coverage was based on specific facts which make its expectations reasonable.” 
(citing Jarvis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 633 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Alaska 1981) (applying California law); 
O’Neill Investigations, Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1177 (Alaska 
1985))); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 721 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he doctrine [of 
reasonable expectation] only applies to situations where an ambiguity exists in the insurance policy.”). 
 154. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 630–31. 
 155. JERRY, supra note 56, at 141–42. 
 156. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. 
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In some situations, the application of the reasonable expectation 
doctrine is crucial to protecting the insured. Commentators have provided 
three solid bases in support of the application of reasonable expectation: 
First, insurance contracts are set forth in insurance policies that 
typically are long, complicated documents which insurers know 
policyholders ordinarily will not even read and certainly will not 
carefully study. Second, the marketing approaches employed for 
most kinds of insurance ordinarily do not even allow a purchaser to 
examine a copy of an insurance policy until after the contract has 
been completed. In life insurance transactions, for example, the 
purchaser usually does not see the insurance policy terms until after 
the application has been submitted, the first premium has been paid, 
the insurance company has decided to approve the application, and 
the company has issued the policy. . . . [I]t is appropriate to protect 
expectations which result from the marketing practices of the 
insurer—that is, actual or reasonable expectations which differ from 
the coverage provisions—that are derived from events or acts which 
were attributable either to the actions of persons in the field 
representing the insurer in the marketing transaction or persons at a 
management center that directs the operations of the insurance 
company. Third, there are many situations in which protection is 
viewed as appropriate because it would be unconscionable or unfair 
to allow an insurer to enforce the limitations and restrictions in the 
insurance policy.
157
 
Therefore, to correct the unequal bargaining power between the insurer 
and the individual insured, it is suggested that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectation should be introduced. 
Furthermore, the improvements in the new law may still result in 
confusion in how to interpret insurance contracts. As indicated in Article 
30 of the 2009 Amendment, when disputes not involving ambiguity occur, 
the clause shall be interpreted as “commonly understood.”158 What exactly 
is “common understanding”? Whose common understanding is it—the 
insurer’s or the insured’s? If it refers to the insured’s common 
understanding, is it based on the particular insured’s subjective standard or 
the reasonable insured’s objective standard? If it means the insurer’s 
common understanding, how can its contradiction with the ambiguity rule 
 
 
REV. 961, 967 (1970). 
 157. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 634–35. 
 158. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 30(1) (2009). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
774 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:749 
 
 
 
 
be reconciled? All of these questions remain unanswered even by 
commentators in China.
159
  
Incorporating commonly used rules of contract interpretation in 
addition to the interpretation of ambiguous terms incorporated in the 2009 
Amendment may further improve the Insurance Law of the PRC. Outside 
of China, the following rules typically apply to the interpretation of an 
insurance contract: 
Rule 1: Words are to be understood in their ordinary sense as they 
would be understood by ordinary people. . . . Rule 2: In the event of 
inconsistency in the ordinary meaning of words in different parts of 
the contract, the court prefers the meaning that best reflects the 
intention of the parties. . . . Rule 3: If it appears that the words have 
been used in a special sense . . . the words will be interpreted in that 
special sense. Rule 4: If, in spite of the application of Rules 1 and 2, 
the meaning of the words is not clear, and Rule 3 is of no assistance 
. . . the words will be construed contra proferentem, that is, against 
the insurer and liberally in favour of policyholders.”160 
Besides the ambiguity rule, incorporating these rules into Article 30 of the 
current Insurance Law would establish a more unequivocal, systematic, 
and complete interpretation of the insurance contract in comparison to the 
present “common understanding” rule. 
2. The “Control of Content” Rule 
The 2009 Amendment also incorporated the rule commonly applied in 
civil law countries called “the control of the contractual content.”161 The 
newly promulgated Article 19 provides: 
 
The following clauses in an insurance contract using the standard 
clauses of the insurer shall be null and void: (1) a clause exempting 
the insurer from any legal obligation or aggravating the liability of 
the insurance applicant or insurant; and (2) a clause excluding any 
legal right of the insurance applicant, insurant or beneficiary.
162
  
 
 
 159. JIANG AN, ZHONGHWA RENMINGONGHEGUO BAOXIANFA SHIYI [EXPLANATION OF THE 
INSURANCE LAW OF THE PRC] 63 (2009). See also WU, supra note 36, at 79; CHONGMIAO & LI, supra 
note 5, at 103. 
 160. CLARKE, supra note 72, at 140. 
 161. CHAO-GUO JIANG, BAOXIANFA JICHU LILUN [THE FUNDAMENTAL THEORIES OF INSURANCE 
LAW] 39 (1996). 
 162. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 19 (2009). 
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This article resembles Germany’s Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der 
Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, AGB-Gesetz (Standard Contract 
Terms Act), Section 9 of which provides: 
(1) Provisions in standard contract terms are void if they 
unreasonably disadvantage the contractual partner of the user 
contrary to the requirements of good faith. (2) In case of doubt, a 
provision is unreasonably disadvantageous if (1) this provision is 
irreconcilable with essential basic principles of the statutory 
provisions from which the terms deviate, or (2) essential rights or 
duties arising from the nature of the contract are restricted to a 
degree which jeopardizes the purpose of the contract being 
attained.
163
 
While this Article is not a critique of German law, the issue associated 
with the addition of Article 19 in the Insurance Law of 2009 is the 
harmonization between the civil law codified in Article 19 and the 
common law codified in Article 30. It is possible that a term may be 
deemed ambiguous and simultaneously places the insured in an 
unreasonably disadvantageous position. In that case, if the court follows 
the ambiguity rule, it is the court’s duty to interpret the contractual terms 
in favor of the insured. If, however, the court simply applies the “control 
of the contractual content rule,” then no further interpretation seems 
necessary. This trick suggests the possibility of regulatory arbitrage within 
the court system. Thus, rules further clarifying the conditions under which 
an article applies are needed. 
Moreover, despite the similarities of Article 19 to German law, 
legislators did not actually duplicate the core spirit of the AGB-Gesetz, 
which adopts the “reasonableness” and “jeopardizing the purpose of the 
contract” as the court’s standard of review.164 In that case, once the 
situation triggers Article 19, such as a clause exempting the insurer from 
any legal obligation, then that contract clause automatically becomes void 
without consideration as to whether releasing the insurer’s liability 
reasonably serves the purpose and practice of insurance. For instance, 
reasonable policies may require the insured to give the notice of loss 
immediately and failure to give notice within a reasonable time may 
provide the insurer with a defense to coverage. Such a provision appears to 
 
 
 163. Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen, [AGB-Gesetz] 
[Standard Contract Terms Act], 1978 § 9, (F.R.G.), available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/ 
AGBG.htm [hereinafter German Standard Contract Terms]. 
 164.  Id. 
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exempt the insurer from its responsibility if the insured fails to give notice 
within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the provision may be deemed 
invalid under Article 19 of the 2009 Amendment. The primary purpose of 
the notice of loss provision, however, is to enable the insurer to investigate 
the circumstances of the loss or claim before information becomes stale or 
disappears.
165
 Therefore, the exemption provision is unreasonable only 
where the insurer’s investigation is not prejudiced by the delay.166  
Since Article 19 lacks the standard of review available in German law, 
various exemption clauses in an insurance policy will be declared void 
through the mechanical application of Article 19, regardless of their 
reasonableness and necessity in conducting the business of insurance. The 
inflexible “control of content” rule is likely to undermine the development 
of the insurance industry. 
3. The Insurer’s Duty to Explain the Contract 
The 2009 Amendment also included the insurer’s duty to explain the 
contract. The new law requires the insurer to explain the contents of the 
contract to the applicant when using standard clauses.
167
 For those clauses 
exempting the insurer from liability in the insurance contract, the insurer 
shall sufficiently warn the applicant of clauses relieving the insurer’s 
obligations set forth in the application form, the insurance policy, or any 
other insurance certificate and expressly explain the contents of such 
clauses to the applicant in writing or verbally.
168
 The insurer’s failure to 
provide such warning or explanation will invalidate those clauses.
169
 
In the United States, the majority of courts have ruled that the insurer 
bears no affirmative duty to explain the policy or its exclusions to the 
insured if the terms in an insurance policy are clear, unambiguous, and 
 
 
 165. JERRY, supra note 56, at 524. 
 166. Majority views in the United States hold that an unexcused failure to give notice will not 
result in a loss of benefits unless the insurer can show that it was prejudiced by the late notice. See, 
e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Feld Car & Truck Leasing Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1132, 1134–35 (D. Kan. 
1981) (holding that (1) a notice of claim filed four and a half years after the accident was not timely; 
however (2) the insurer was required to show that it was prejudiced by the untimely notice of claim 
before it could avoid liability under the policy.); see also Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Modern 
Status of Rules Requiring Liability Insurer to Show Prejudice to Escape Liability Because of Insured’s 
Failure or Delay in Giving Notice of Accident or Claim, or in Forwarding Suit Papers, 32 A.L.R. 4th 
141, 145 (1984) (discussing trends of courts requiring insurers demonstrate prejudice in addition to 
untimely notice and, in so holding, courts frequently discussed the insured’s “reasonable 
expectations”). 
 167. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 17(1) (2009). 
 168. Id. art. 17(2). 
 169. Id. 
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explicit.
170
 Arguments affirming the insurer’s duty to explain the policy 
reason that “the doctrine of reasonable expectations can operate to impose 
de facto a duty on the insurer to explain the policy’s coverage to the 
insured.”171 In Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,172 the court 
ruled: 
Insurance policies are contracts of the utmost good faith and must 
be administered and performed as such by the insurer. Good faith 
“demands that the insurer deal with laymen as laymen and not as 
experts in the subtleties of law and underwriting.” In all insurance 
contracts, particularly where the language expressing the extent of 
the coverage may be deceptive to the ordinary layman, there is an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that the insurer will 
not do anything to injure the right of its policyholder to receive the 
benefits of his contract. This covenant goes deeper than the mere 
surface of the writing. When a loss occurs which because of its 
expertise the insurer knows or should know is within the coverage, 
and the dealings between the parties reasonably put the company on 
notice that the insured relies upon its integrity, fairness and honesty 
of purpose, and expects his right to payment to be considered, the 
obligation to deal with him takes on the highest burden of good 
faith. In situations where a layman might give the controlling 
language of the policy a more restrictive interpretation than the 
insurer knows the courts have given it and as a result the 
uninformed insured might be inclined to be quiescent about the 
disregard or non-payment of his claim and not to press it in timely 
fashion, the company cannot ignore its obligation. It cannot hide 
behind the insured’s ignorance of the law; it cannot conceal its 
liability. In these circumstances it has the duty to speak and 
disclose, and to act in accordance with its contractual undertaking. 
The slightest evidence of deception or overreaching will bar 
reliance upon time limitations for prosecution of the claim.
173
 
 
 
 170. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983) 
(“[W]here, as here, the policy limitation relied upon by the insurer to deny coverage is clearly worded 
and conspicuously displayed, the insured could may not avoid the consequences of that limitation by 
proof that it he failed to read the limitation or that it he did not understand it.”); Realin v. State Farm 
Fire and & Cas. Co., 418 So.2d 431, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (“[A]n insurer has no duty to 
explain uninsured motorist coverage to an insurance applicant unless asked . . . .”). 
 171. JERRY, supra note 56, at 185. 
 172. 250 A.2d 580 (1969). 
 173. Id. at 587–88 (citations omitted). 
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Observing the practice, insurance policies are typically long and 
complicated documents that insurers realize most policyholders will not 
even read, much less study.
174
 In addition, numerous insurance policies 
“cannot be understood without detailed analysis, and often not even an 
extended consideration of the terms would fully [reveal to] an insured of 
the precise scope of coverage and the meaning of the limitations or 
restrictions [embedded] in a particular policy.”175 Even in the case where 
the insured does attempt to analyze the policy and has only limited 
expertise of law and insurance theory, it is very likely that the insured will 
become frustrated. For these reasons, in China’s relatively young 
insurance market, where insurance purchasers do not have extensive 
experience in this matter, it is better to retain the insurer’s duty to explain 
the policy in its insurance law.  
Mature insurance markets like Germany also impose on an insurer the 
duty to advise and provide necessary information to the policyholder. 
Pursuant to the German Insurance Contract Act, “[b]efore the contract is 
concluded, the insurer shall provide the policyholder with the advice in 
writing [without undue delay], clearly and comprehensibly stating 
reasons.”176 The insurer is also under the duty to “inform the policyholder 
in writing of his terms of contract, including the general terms and 
conditions of insurance, as well as the information [mandated in statutory 
laws], . . . in good time before the policyholder submits his contractual 
acceptance.
177
  
The 2009 Amendment is a step in the right direction.  
D. Double Insurance 
Double insurance was previously governed by Article 41 of the 
Insurance Law of 2002. The insured is carrying double insurance when the 
insured has two or more insurers to insure the same subject matter with the 
same insurable interest and the same risks.
178
 The insured is obligated to 
notify each insurer of the other insurance policies.
179
 If the sum of the 
amount insured under all contracts exceeds the value of the subject matter, 
the sum of proceeds paid by all insurers shall not exceed such value.
180
 
 
 
 174. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, § 6.3(4). 
 175. Id. 
 176. VVG § 6(2) (2008). 
 177. Id. § 7(1). 
 178. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 41(3) (2002).  
 179. Id. art. 41(1). 
 180. Id. art. 41(2). 
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Unless otherwise provided, each insurer shall only share the loss on a pro-
rata basis.
181
  
The new law incorporates slight changes to the treatment of double 
insurance. The 2009 Amendment has two additions: (1) it limits the 
application of the double insurance provision only to the situation where 
the sum of the amount insured exceeds the insurable value of the subject 
matter; and (2) on the basis of the pro-rata contribution provision, the 
insured is entitled to the refund of premiums paid claim from each insurer 
in exchange for the protection exceeding the insurable value of the subject 
matter.
182
 While the second change meets the doctrine of consideration, 
the first change is inconsistent with the principle of indemnity.  
The principle of indemnity indicates that “the amount recovered be 
commensurate with the amount lost.”183 Even in the case of 
underinsurance, when the insured suffers only a partial loss, unjust 
enrichment may still occur. For example, suppose that insurance 
companies A, B, and C insure Mr. X’s sedan, valued at $10,000, for 
$3,000, $2,000, and $1,000, respectively. If the car is damaged in an 
accident and the repairs cost $1,000, without Mr. X notifying all the 
insurers, he might successfully claim $1,000 in compensation from each 
insurer because insurers A, B, and C have no knowledge of existence of 
the other policies insuring the same car, not to mention the fact that Mr. X 
might have intentionally damaged the car. 
If, pursuant to the new law, the insured still bores the duty to notify 
insurers of double insurance, what would be the consequence of violation? 
Requiring this duty would deter people who over-insure their property in 
order to destroy or damage it and then collect on each of the insurance 
policies.
184
 Under British law, courts tend to approve the forfeiture clause, 
which requires the insured to notify the insurer if he is carrying double 
insurance during the life of a policy. The sanction for non-disclosure is the 
forfeiture or cancellation of the policy.
185
 In the United States, courts 
generally agree with insurers that when additional insurance is purchased 
for an insured property without permission from the insurer who has 
already insured the property (“first insurer”), it increases the likelihood 
 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. Insurance Law of the PRC, arts. 56(3)–(4)  (2009). 
 183. HODGIN, supra note 102, at 28. 
 184. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 259. 
 185. E.g., Steadfast Ins. Co. Ltd. v. F & B Trading Co. Pty. Ltd., (1972) 46 A.L.R. 10; see also 
BIRDS, supra note 142, at 345–46. 
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that such property might be intentionally destroyed to recover the 
proceeds, especially when the property is over-insured.
186
  
The drafters of insurance policies have designed an “escape clause” 
with the goal of eliminating all liability under the insurance policy when 
the insured has purchased additional insurance policies without the 
permission of the first insurer.
187
 “[E]scape clauses in property insurance 
policies . . . [are] often upheld.”188 Without the legal consequence imposed 
on the person breaching his duty to notify, however, it seems unlikely that 
the new law’s Article 56 will effectively implement the principle of 
indemnity and, therefore, may enable an insured’s unjust enrichment.  
To prevent this type of unjust enrichment, the legislature may consider 
amending Article 56 to include the insured’s right to forfeit the insurance 
policy, like in Germany’s insurance law. The German Insurance Contract 
Act provides a worthwhile model on this matter. It mandates that 
“[a]nyone who insures the same interest against the same risk with several 
insurers . . . inform each insurer about the other insurances without undue 
delay.”189 Furthermore, each contract made “with the intention of thereby 
gaining an illegal pecuniary benefit . . . shall be void; the insurer shall be 
entitled to the insurance premium up until such time as he learned of the 
circumstances establishing the nullity.”190 
E. Insurance Fraud 
The 2009 Amendment retained most of the old law’s provisions related 
to insurance fraud. The 2009 Amendment retained the section regulating 
the insurer’s immunity from paying the proceeds when, after the 
occurrence of an insured incident, the applicant, the insured, or the 
beneficiary, fabricated the cause of the incident or overstated the amount 
of losses by forging or altering the certificates, materials, or other 
 
 
 186. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 259–60. 
 187. Id. at 259. 
 188. Id. at 260. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Merchants’ & Bankers Mut. Ins. Co., 66 N.W. 175, 176 
(Iowa 1896) (holding that an insurance company has the right to write in the contract the escape clause 
that its liability consequent upon a change in the contract shall be in writing); Zimmerman v. Home 
Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y., 42 N.W. 462 (Iowa 1889); Kirkman v. Farmers’ Ins. Co., 57 N.W. 952 
(Iowa 1894); Hankins v. Rockford Ins. Co., 35 N.W. 34, 36 (Wis. 1887) (“[W]hen the assured has 
accepted a policy containing a clause prohibiting the waiver of any of its provisions [including the 
escape clause] by the local agent, he is bound by such inhibition, and that any subsequently attempted 
waiver, merely by virtue of such agency, is a nullity.”); Cleaver v. Traders’ Ins. Co. 32 N.W. 660, 663 
(Mich. 1887) (“[T]he holder of the policy is estopped, by accepting the policy, from setting up or 
relying upon powers in the agent in opposition to limitations and restrictions in the policy.”). 
 189. VVG, § 77(1) (2008). 
 190. Id. § 78(3). 
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evidence.
191
 It also elaborated on the fraud provision by providing that 
where the insured or the beneficiary files a claim while intentionally 
deceiving the insurer about the occurrence, the insurer shall have the right 
to rescind the contract and keep the premiums.
192
  
Despite the objective of fraud deterrence in Article 27, to penalize the 
insured or the beneficiaries who have used deception to claim for 
payments from the insurer,
193
 it is flawed in two related respects. First, in 
the case of a life insurance claim where only one of the several designated 
primary beneficiaries committed fraud, conferring upon the insurer the 
right to rescind the contract violates the rule that where the beneficiary 
intentionally caused the death of the insured, regardless of his 
disqualification, “the proceeds go to any remaining primary beneficiaries, 
or, if there are none, to designated contingent beneficiaries.”194  
Likewise, the second flaw is that legislators failed to consider the 
divisibility of the insurance coverage. Under the general rule of contract 
law, 
[i]f the performances to be exchanged under an exchange of 
promises can be apportioned into corresponding pairs of part 
performances so that the parts of each pair are properly regarded as 
agreed equivalents, a party’s performance of his part of such a pair 
has the same effect on the other’s duties to render performance of 
the agreed equivalent as it would have if only that pair of 
performances had been promised.
195
 
Here, “the insured’s breach of one portion of an insurance contract will not 
deprive the insured of the full measure of the insurer’s promised 
performance,” unless the contract is indivisible.196 For example, if a policy 
covers three perils and collects three premiums, such as an automobile 
policy that has collision, comprehensive loss, and liability coverage, the 
insured is considered to own three different policies for three different 
perils even though the coverage is stated within the parameters of one 
written contract.
197
  
Therefore, under the premise that multiple perils contained in the single 
contract at issue are divisible, the insurer’s right to rescind the contract in 
 
 
 191. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 27(3)  (2009); Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 28(3)  (2002). 
 192. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 27(1)  (2009). 
 193. WU, supra note 36, at 70–71. 
 194. JERRY, supra note 56, at 297 (citing Lee v. Aylward, 790 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1990) (en banc)). 
 195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1981). 
 196. JERRY, supra note 56, at 714. 
 197. Id. at 714–15. 
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Article 27, thereby voiding the entire contract, is inconsistent with general 
contract principles. Article 27 would more properly align with general 
contract principles if the insurer’s rescission were restricted only to the 
part of the coverage directly related to the fraud; otherwise, Article 27 
permits the invalidation of the untainted part of the contract without 
grounds. 
IV. UNFINISHED BUSINESS: WHAT STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE? 
The 2009 Amendment has addressed many issues that the Insurance 
Law of 2002 ignored, especially the efforts to achieve a higher level of 
consumer protection and a more solid corporate governance mechanism 
for insurance companies. Nevertheless, some problems associated with the 
Insurance Law of 2002 were not dealt with in the 2009 Amendment. The 
discussion in the next section reveals these shortcomings. 
A. The Structure of Legislation 
The Insurance Law of 2002 and the 2009 Amendment mistakenly 
combine two types of law: (1) insurance contract law, which is civil 
legislation; and (2) the laws regarding insurance supervision and 
administration, or administrative law. “In societies that pledge adherence 
to notions of the rule of law, it is theoretically and conceptually necessary 
to maintain a distinct separation between civil and administrative 
legislation.”198 In fact, many of the world’s leading insurance markets, 
such as Germany and Japan, utilize dual statutes: one regulates contractual 
transactions and the other regulates government administration in the 
marketplace.
199
 Under insurance law, the issue is to clearly and carefully 
separate matters better dealt with through contractual agreements of 
mutual consensus from matters appropriately governed by administrative 
mediation.”200 Separate legislation will serve to “protect insurance 
participants’ rights from being arbitrarily subjected to inappropriate 
administrative power.”201 Furthermore, the use of separate statutes to 
address contractual and administrative aspects functions such that an 
amendment made to one part may not affect the other. “This practice 
maintains the continuity and stability of the law as a whole, and minimizes 
 
 
 198. Guojian & Mertl, supra note 25, at 23. 
 199. See FINANCIAL SERVICE AGENCY, http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/about/syosyou.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
 200. Guojian & Mertl, supra note 25, at 23. 
 201. Id. 
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disruption to the balance between flexibility and consistency built into the 
overall regulatory system.”202 
B. Insurance Contract 
Three issues concerning the insurance contract need further revisions. 
First, there is a mismatch between the principle of indemnity and the 
approach of categorizing the insurance contract in the 2009 Amendment. 
Second, the scope of the insurer’s right to subrogate is excessively broad. 
Third, virtually no article in the 2009 Amendment provides for various 
types of insurance contract. 
1. Classification of Insurance Contracts 
The 2009 Amendment retains the structure of the old law, which 
categorized insurance contracts into property insurance and personal 
insurance. While such a classification is not technically wrong, it is 
inaccurate under the principle of indemnity. Generally, in an insurance 
contract in which the principle of indemnity applies, the insurer agrees to 
indemnify the insured for the actual loss suffered if a particular incident 
occurs. This type of insurance contract is recognized as a “contract of 
indemnity.”203 Conversely, a contingency policy refers to an insurance 
contract in which the insurer, on the occurrence of a particular incident, 
promises to pay a fixed sum determined not by an estimate of the loss 
suffered, but rather by the amount of coverage agreed upon in the 
insurance contract.
204
 An indemnity policy that also includes the insurer’s 
promise to pay hospital bills in a personal accident policy or a health 
insurance policy is still considered personal insurance according to the 
Insurance Law of the PRC.
205
  
Pursuant to the present Insurance Law, rules derived from the principle 
of indemnity, namely the rule regulating double insurance, the insurer’s 
right of subrogation, and the rule banning over-insurance, are all 
applicable only to “property insurance policies.”206 The confusion arises 
when determining whether such rules apply to policies of personal 
insurance that are in fact indemnity contracts, such as health insurance or 
 
 
 202. Id. at 24. 
 203. LOWRY & RAWLINGS, supra note 45, at 14–15. 
 204. Malcolm Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty-First Century 27 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2005), available at http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-927330-8.pdf. 
 205. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 46  (2009). 
 206. See id. arts. 55, 56, 60. 
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credit life insurance. If the answer is negative, the principle of indemnity 
does not seem to have been completely executed, and such a problem 
could lead to cases of an insured’s unjust enrichment by taking advantage 
of this loophole.  
In order to extinguish the insured’s incentive to take advantage of such 
a legislative flaw, insurance contracts must be re-categorized as indemnity 
contracts and contingency contracts in a timely manner. Such a change 
would be consistent with the German Insurance Contract Act and the 
Japanese Insurance Law, which also conform to the indemnity-
contingency categorization.
207
 
2. The Insurer’s Right of Subrogation 
Both the Insurance Law of 2002 and the 2009 Amendment grant the 
insurer a right, after having indemnified the insured, to subrogate the 
insured’s claim for indemnity against the third party who incurred the loss 
up to the amount of proceeds paid.
208
 Furthermore, the Insurance Law 
provides that the insurer’s right of subrogation shall not prejudice the 
insured’s claim against the third party for the portion of losses not 
indemnified by the insurer.
209
  
Compared to the British or American common law, Chinese law should 
be supplemented in at least three respects. First, because subrogation 
rights are not independent rights that insurers can exercise against the 
wrongdoer, the indemnifying insurer is entitled only to use the means by 
which the insured might have protected himself against or reimbursed 
himself for the loss.
210
 Thus, the insurer who steps into the shoes of the 
insured has no more rights than the insured and cannot take actions that 
the insured could not have undertaken.
211
 Therefore, subrogation comes 
into operation when the insured has a legally enforceable right against a 
party who caused the loss, including any tortfeasors and the party 
breaching the contract, and the law gives the insured rights of 
compensation.
212
 The “insurer generally is not entitled to be subrogated to 
rights that may exist as a consequence of a liability claim against its own 
 
 
 207. See VVG, §§ 74-208 (2008); Japan Insurance Law, art. 3-94 (2008). 
 208. Japan Insurance Law, art. 60(1); Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 45 (1) (2002). 
 209. Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 60(3) (2009); Insurance Law of the PRC, art. 45(3) (2002). 
 210. Simpson v. Thomson, Birrell (1877), 3 App. Cas. (H.L.) 279, at 284 (appeal taken from 
Scot.). 
 211. HODGIN, supra note 102, at 563–64. 
 212. Id. at 564. 
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insured” person.213 Article 59 has expanded the scope of insurer’s right of 
subrogation to every “third party who incurred the loss” regardless of 
whether those third parties are liable for the insured’s damage or are 
involved due to their relationship with the insured, such as an employer or 
spouse of the insured. Confusion may arise because of its overly broad 
reach. 
Second, it remains unclear whether the insurer’s right of subrogation 
can only be activated after the insured’s indemnification is completed. The 
current law prohibits the insurer, in executing his right of subrogation, 
from interfering with the insured’s claim against the third party for the 
portion of losses not indemnified. The law, however, is silent as to when 
the insurer may invoke its right to subrogation. In the United States, if the 
insurer has paid only a portion of the amount that it is required to pay in 
accordance with the policy, the insured has not been indemnified in full 
for the loss and the insurer is not entitled to be subrogated to the insurer’s 
rights.
214
 Even when the insurer pays the insured the full amount under the 
insurance contract, if the sum paid is insufficient to indemnify the insured 
for his losses, the insurer may still have no right of subrogation.
215
 The 
rationale for such rules is simple: a subrogation right before the insured’s 
receipt of full indemnification would make the insurer a competitor with 
the insured for the remainder of the tortfeasor’s payment.216 To promote 
organized and fair distribution of third party payments, it is necessary to 
clarify the wording of the Insurance Law. 
Finally, nothing in the current law deals with the insured’s interference 
with an insurer’s right of subrogation, especially when a settlement 
between the third party and the insured has prejudiced that right.
217
 
Common law rules indicate that the insured’s act of releasing the third 
party after a loss without the insurer’s consent, though effective to the 
insurer, is an interference with the insurer’s right of subrogation.218 
Therefore, any compromise between the insured and the tortfeasor will 
discharge the insured’s obligations to the insurer under the contract, and 
the insurer is entitled to the return of any payments already made to the 
insured.
219
 A rule similar to the common law rules regarding settlements 
 
 
 213. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 43, at 221; BIRDS, supra note 142, at 321. 
 214. E.g., Baillio v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 189 So. 2d 605 (La. Ct. App. 1966). 
 215. E.g., Capps v. Klebs, 382 N.E. 2d 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978). 
 216. JERRY, supra note 56, at 606. 
 217. POH, supra note 215, at 580. 
 218. BIRDS, supra note 142, at 319. 
 219. Compare e.g., Ankney v. Franch, 652 A.2d 1138, 1146 (Md. App. 1995). 
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and interference with the insurer’s right of subrogation should also be 
added to the subrogation clause. 
3. Issues Associated with Various Types of Insurance 
The 2009 Amendment concerning the insurance contract concentrates 
only on general principles. Except for two simple articles dealing 
specifically with issues in liability insurance contracts—the third party’s 
right to file a direct claim against the liability insurer and insurer’s duty to 
defend—no other parts of the current law arose from a particular type of 
contract, such as accident policies, auto insurance, various liability 
insurances, annuities, surety bonds, fidelity bonds, or group insurance.  
The present use of general principles in the Insurance Law, as opposed 
to articulating specific laws by contract type is odd for civil law countries 
like China, where the primary source of law is the legal code.
220
 The fact 
that most laws are codified in statutory form is considered the most 
significant distinction between a civil law and a common law system, in 
which judge-made law established in court decisions predominates.
221
 
Germany’s civil law statutes reflect such specific regulations: the German 
Insurance Contract Act regulates property insurance,
222
 liability 
insurance,
223
 legal expense insurance,
224
 transport insurance,
225
 fire 
insurance,
226
 life insurance,
227
 disability insurance,
228
 accident insurance,
229
 
and health insurance,
230
 in respective chapters. Even in common law 
countries, however, regulating various types of insurance contracts 
through statutory laws is not uncommon. The California Insurance Code 
resembles the civil law statutes of Germany because it contains specific 
chapters governing fire insurance,
231
 marine insurance,
232
 life and 
disability insurance,
233
 group life insurance,
234
 and insurance covering 
 
 
 220. B. SHARON BYRD, INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW AND LANGUAGE 3 (1997). 
 221. For details, see ALAN B. MORRISON ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN LAW 10–14 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1996). 
 222. See VVG, §§ 88–99 (2008). 
 223. See id. §§ 100–12. 
 224. See id. §§ 125–29. 
 225. See id. §§ 130–41. 
 226. See id. §§ 142–49. 
 227. See id. §§ 150–71. 
 228. See VVG, §§ 172–77. 
 229. See id. §§ 178–91. 
 230. See id. §§ 192–208. 
 231. See CA Ins. Code §§ 2030–84 (2009). 
 232. See id. §§ 1880–2010. 
 233. See id. §§ 10110–98. 
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land.
235
 Hence, incorporating issues associated with different types of 
insurance contracts into the statutory law is another essential step toward a 
better insurance code in China.  
V. CONCLUSION 
With respect to the portion related to insurance contracts, the 2009 
Amendment has improved the protection of policyholders while stressing 
the obligations of both parties derived from the duty of utmost good 
faith.
236
 Through changes to almost every article in the Insurance Law of 
2002, the new law has clarified several questions associated with 
insurance contracts under the old law, such as issues related to insurable 
interests, the insured’s duty of disclosure, and double insurance. 
Regrettably, some problems found in the 2002 Insurance Law remain, and 
some new issues arise as a result of the 2009 Amendment. Because the 
modern insurance law regime of PRC was not established until 1995, 
expecting the Insurance Law of the PRC and related regulations to be 
perfected through the addition of two amendments in 2002 and 2009 is 
unrealistic.  
This Article suggests ways in which the Insurance Law of the PRC 
could further improve by offering critiques of the present law and 
proposing future amendments with respect to insurance contracts and 
insurance regulations. The current Insurance Law of the PRC still needs to 
address several issues related to insurance contracts, including the 
definition and status of the insured in life insurance contracts, the time 
when an insurable interest must exist, the scope of the insured’s duty of 
disclosure, the return of a premium associated with the rescission of the 
contract, the divisibility issue in the case of insurance fraud, the 
categorization of insurance contracts in accordance with the principle of 
indemnity, and the “full indemnity” standard in an insurer’s right of 
subrogation.  
While this Article covers only the first half of the 2009 Amendment 
that relates to insurance contracts, the second half of the 2009 Amendment 
 
 
 234. See id. §§ 10200–14. 
 235. See id. §§ 12340–661. 
 236. WU, supra note 36, at 2. 
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addressing various issues concerning the regulation and supervision of 
insurance companies needs the same level of attention. Further studies are 
essential to satisfy the demand for a comprehensive and clear Insurance 
Law of the PRC.  
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